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Abstract
Preferential trade agreement (PTA) members have to eliminate internal tari¤s
with each other but are allowed to discriminate against non-members. This can
be in potential conict with the WTOs overall non-discrimination clause. Using a
competing exporters model of endogenous trade agreement formation, we study the
central rules that govern PTAs. We nd that the free trade agreements (FTAs)
requirement to eliminate internal tari¤s increases total welfare when circumstances
are such that global free trade is infeasible. However, it also reduces the likelihood
of reaching global free trade. We also nd that the MFN constraint does not just
contribute to the achievement of global free trade but also delivers a welfare-superior
outcome when global free trade is not possible. Finally, we show that the MFN
constraint complements the PTA rules in achieving global free trade for only FTAs
but not customs unions (CUs). However, when global free trade is infeasible, the MFN
constraint is welfare improving for both types of PTAs. We conclude that while the
likelihood of global free trade within the WTO requirements depends on the nature of
PTAs, these requirements are necessarily welfare improving in a tari¤-ridden world.
Keywords: WTO, Coalition proof Nash equilibrium, Free Trade Agreement, Cus-
toms Union. JEL Classications: F11, F12.
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1 Introduction
Trade liberalization at the World Trade Organization (WTO) occurs through two major
channels: (i) periodic rounds of multilateral negotiations that are open to all member
countries and (ii) the formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that entail the
exchange of trade policy concessions amongst only a subset of WTO members. Both
channels of trade liberalization are subject to some key rules that participating countries
are obligated to follow. The central rule governing multilateral negotiations is the most-
favored-nation (MFN) clause of the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) that
requires each WTO member to treat imports of like products from other member countries
in a non-discriminatory manner. MFN constitutes the very rst Article of the GATT and
is widely viewed as the central pillar of the world trading system. However, to some extent
its salience is called into question by the existence of Article XXIV of GATT the legal
clause that sanctions preferential and/or discriminatory trade liberalization amongst WTO
members subject to certain conditions, the most important of which are that PTA members
must eliminate internal tari¤s on substantially all tradewith each other and also refrain
from increasing their external MFN tari¤s on non-members.
In this paper, we utilize a modied version of the three-country competing exporters
framework of Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) to highlight the implications of Article XXIVs
stipulation that countries entering into a PTA should essentially move to free internal trade
by eliminating tari¤s on substantially all trade between themselves. Focusing on free trade
agreements (FTAs), the most commonly occurring type of PTAs, we investigate the welfare
implications of this free internal trade requirement facing FTAs as well as its e¤ect on the
likelihood of achieving global free trade. In the existing literature on FTAs, Article XXIV
has often been invoked as a justication for the assumption that FTA members impose
zero tari¤s on each other. While reasonable, this approach masks the incentives underly-
ing the tari¤-setting behavior of FTA members and, by design, fails to shed light on the
consequences of requiring them to fully liberalize internal trade. Moreover, when a group
of countries forms a PTA, countries who are not members of an PTA, by choice or not, are
required to extend MFN treatment to the PTA members even though they face discrimina-
tion at the hands of these member countries. This inevitably generates a domino e¤ect that
compels non-member countries to follow suit and seek similar discriminatory preferences
so as to o¤set the negative impact of the PTA on them. One potential reaction might be
deviation from MFN treatment and impose discriminatory tari¤s and trade policies. We
examine the welfare implications of such a deviation and its e¤ect on the prospect of global
2
free trade.
Our conceptual approach to the formation of trade agreements follows Saggi and Yildiz
(2010) who develop an equilibrium theory of FTAs.1 Assuming FTA members impose zero
tari¤s on one another, they compare the relative merits of bilateralism and multilateralism
as alternative routes to global trade liberalization. In the present paper, like Saggi and
Yildiz (2010), we begin with a WTO-consistent benchmark scenario under which FTA
members are required to eliminate tari¤s on each other and the non-member is obligated
to follow the MFN principle of non-discrimination when setting its tari¤s on FTA members.
We next compare this WTO-consistent benchmark with two alternative settings. Under our
rst alternative scenario called unconstrained preferential liberalization FTA members
have the freedom to implement jointly optimal internal tari¤s as opposed to having to set
such tari¤s to zero as a precondition for forming the FTA.2 Under the second scenario 
called tari¤ discrimination the non-member country does not have to abide by MFN and
is free to impose its optimal discriminatory tari¤s on FTA members. Intuitively, the tari¤
discrimination scenario helps determine whether there is a sound rationale for requiring a
country to practice non-discrimination when it itself faces discrimination at the hands of
FTA members.
A comparison of the WTO-consistent scenario with the unconstrained preferential lib-
eralization scenario delivers several interesting results. First, we show that when FTA
members are allowed to choose and coordinate their internal tari¤s to maximize their joint
welfare, they indeed have an incentive to impose positive tari¤s on one another. We argue
that this incentive arises due to the interplay between two forces: the lack of external tari¤
coordination between FTA members and the complementarity of imports tari¤s. Each FTA
member individually set its external tari¤ on the non-member and this lack of coordination
leads each FTA member to ignore the benets that its external tari¤ confers on its partner
 if one FTA member raises its tari¤ on the non-member country, exports of the other
member to its market increase but each FTA member ignores this e¤ect on its partners
export surplus while setting its external tari¤. However, each FTA member ignores this
e¤ect on its partners export surplus while setting its own external tari¤. Thus, the in-
dividually optimal external tari¤s of FTA members are too low from the perspective of
1Saggi et. al (2013) build on Saggi and Yildiz (2010) by considering trade agreements that take the
form of customs unions as opposed to FTAs.
2While in theory Article XXIV requires FTA members to impose zero internal tari¤s on each other, in
practice this is often not the case. In an analysis of PTAs involving 85 countries and 90 percent of world
trade in 2007, roughly two-thirds of tari¤ lines with MFN rates greater than 15 percent have not been
reduced through PTAs (see Bagwell et. al, 2016 and WTO, 2011)
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their joint welfare. The existence of tari¤ complementarity and the lack of external tari¤
coordination together imply that, while coordinating their internal tari¤s, FTA members
deliberately choose to set positive internal tari¤s on each other: doing so commits each of
them to a higher external tari¤ on the non-member country thereby bringing the individu-
ally optimal external tari¤s of FTA members closer to jointly optimal ones. To conrm the
role that external tari¤ coordination plays in generating positive internal tari¤s within an
FTA, we also consider a setting where FTA members can coordinate their external as well
as internal tari¤s, as they might be able to do under a customs union (CU). Under such a
case, members indeed nd it optimal to engage in free internal trade. This result suggests
that the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV is likely to be more binding for
FTAs relative to CUs.3 Although we nd general evidence that FTAs have more excluded
sectors than CUs, there is a lack of comprehensive empirical evidence on internal tari¤s and
excluded sectors in FTAs and CUs.4 Freund and Ornelas (2010) highlighted the wide range
of implementation rates of PTAs as a vital research area that has received little attention.5
The second major insight delivered by our analysis is that requiring FTA members to
eliminate internal tari¤s benets the non-member since it leads to lower external tari¤s
on the part of FTA members. This result, driven by tari¤ complementarity, is noteworthy
since part of the original intent behind the design of Article XXIV is plausibly to minimize
any potential negative e¤ects of FTAs on non-member countries. Ostensibly, this objective
was met by prohibiting FTA members from raising their external tari¤s on outsiders.
However, in our model, it turns out that FTA members have no incentive to increase their
external tari¤s on the non-member country anyway.6 Thus, the Article XXIV stipulation
3This result is in line with Kennan and Riezman (1990), Yi (1996), Bagwell and Staiger (1998), Cadot,
de Melo, and Olarreaga (1999), Freund (2000), and Ornelas (2007).
4Liu (2010) studies how the inuence of special interest groups relative to voters a¤ect the choice
between partial-scope (under the Enabling Clause which allows further exception to non-discrimination
treatment under GATT Article XXIV) and full-edged (FTAs and CUs) trade agreements.
5Using product exclusions from 15 FTAs signed by the US, EU, Japan, and Canada, Damuri (2012)
shows that 7 percent of tari¤ lines are excluded, either temporarily or permanently. Agriculture and food
products are the most protected products while manufactured products are the least protected. These
product exclusions are also di¤erent across FTAs with di¤erent partners, highlighting the discriminatory
feature of FTAs. Product exclusion is correlated with the regime of trade protection proxied by MFN tari¤
rates. Studying the bilateral trade agreements of countries in ASEAN, APEC, and South Asia, Menon
(2009) also nds that the most commonly excluded sector is agriculture. In the example of Japans trade
agreement with Mexico, 13 percent of Mexicos exports to Japan are excluded from the trade agreement.
In comparison, CUs like the European Union are fully implemented (Freund and Ornelas, 2010). Mercusor
also only excluded sugar and automobiles (Olarreaga and Soloaga, 1998).
6This result also arises in Richardson (1993, 1995). Since an FTA shifts imports away from non-member
countries, Richardson (1993) shows that in a model with endogenous protection FTA countries have an
incentive to lower external tari¤s to shift these imports back if the diverted imports reduce its welfare.
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that FTA members cannot raise tari¤s on outsiders may actually do little to protect the
interests of outsiders. The idea that the requirement of free internal trade amongst FTA
members could imply lower tari¤s for outsiders was probably unforeseen at the time the
relevant GATT rules were crafted. Instead, it seems more likely that the requirement of
zero internal tari¤s was designed to promote trade creation amongst FTA members. Our
analysis demonstrates that, somewhat surprisingly, it is the Article XXIV requirement of
free internal trade amongst FTA members that ends up protecting the non-member as
opposed to the restriction on external tari¤s imposed on FTA members.
Our third major result pertaining to the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV
is that having such a requirement makes it harder to achieve global free trade. The logic for
this result is as follows. By lowering the external tari¤s of FTA members, the free internal
trade requirement of Article XXIV makes it less attractive for the non-member to enter
into trade agreements with them by staying out, it remains free to impose its optimal
import tari¤s while facing relatively lower tari¤s in the markets of FTA countries due to
the disciplining force of the free internal trade requirement.7 Thus, the free internal trade
requirement of Article XXIV might facilitate some degree of free-riding in the WTO system
since it allows non-member countries to benet from reductions in external tari¤s of FTA
members that result from their internal trade liberalization without having to o¤er any tari¤
cuts of their own. Thus, our overall message is somewhat nuanced: when circumstances
are such that achieving global free trade is not possible, the free internal trade requirement
of Article XXIV increases world welfare by reducing tari¤s world-wide but, at the same
time, it also reduces the likelihood of reaching global free trade.
While Article XXIV legitimizes tari¤ discrimination in the form of PTAs, the MFN
principle requires WTO members to treat all other members (with whom they do not have
PTAs) in a non-discriminatory fashion. From existing literature we know that optimal MFN
tari¤s generally impose fewer distortions than optimally chosen discriminatory tari¤s.8 A
comparison of the WTO-consistent scenario with the tari¤ discrimination scenario brings
to light a hitherto ignored benet of MFN: by making tari¤ discrimination infeasible, MFN
reduces the potency of a countrys optimal tari¤s and therefore its incentive for unilaterally
7Free-rider problem caused by the MFN rule has been examined in multilateral trade negotiations
setting (see Johnson, 1965; Caplin and Krishna, 1988 and Ludema and Mayda, 2009, 2013). Wong (2017)
also shows that the free rider problem removes global free trade as a stable outcome in multilateral trade
negotiations. However, our paper shows that the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV can
facilitate a free-rider problem as well for the non-member.
8See Choi (1995), Bagwell and Staiger (1999b), Horn and Mavroidis (2001), McCalman (2002), Saggi
(2004), and Bagwell and Staiger (2010) for anlyses of the various legal and economic aspects of MFN.
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opting out of trade liberalization with other countries. Thus, by increasing the likelihood
of each country voluntarily choosing to enter into international trade agreements, the MFN
principle can act as a catalyst for trade liberalization. However, we also show that this
pro-liberalization e¤ect of MFN is weaker when one country is deliberately excluded by the
other two (who prefer a bilateral trade agreement to a multilateral one). In other words, we
show that the welfare case for requiring a country to follow MFN as a non-member trading
with countries that are in a bilateral FTA with each other is stronger if it has voluntarily
chosen to not enter into trade agreements with its trading partners relative to a scenario
where it has been excluded from their bilateral FTA against its wishes. In our model, a pair
of countries have an incentive to exclude the third country only when they can coordinate
their external tari¤s which is in the case of CUs. The practical implication of this result
is that the case for requiring MFN on the part of countries trading with CUs from which
they have been deliberately excluded is relatively weaker than the case for MFN on the
part of countries that have chosen not to join FTAs in order to benet from the reductions
in the external tari¤s of FTA members while themselves retaining the freedom to utilize
their optimal discriminatory tari¤s.
Since Bhagwati (1991), the literature has paid signicant attention to whether PTAs
serve as building or stumbling blocs for multilateral trade liberalization. The early literature
on this issue generally took PTAs as exogenously given and focused on how PTA mem-
bership a¤ects the incentives that countries have for participating in multilateral trade
liberalization (see, for example, Krishna, 1998; Ornelas, 2005a,b). More recent studies,
such as Goyal and Joshi (2006), Aghion et al. (2007), Furusawa and Konishi (2007), and
Seidman (2009) consider endogenous PTAs but ignore the possibility of trade liberalization
on an MFN basis. Under this approach, PTAs are seen as building blocs so long as their
pursuit eventually leads to global free trade. However, Saggi and Yildiz (2010 and 2011),
Saggi et. al (2013), Missios et al. (2016) and Stoyanov and Yildiz (2015) have argued that
PTAs ought to be seen as building blocks only if the freedom to pursue PTAs (granted to
WTO members by GATT Article XXIV) is necessary for achieving global free trade. An
attractive feature of this line of research is that it treats both preferential and multilateral
liberalization as being endogenous. The present paper follows this approach and furthers
the literature on the building versus stumbling bloc question by showing that the free in-
ternal trade requirement of Article XXIV makes it harder to achieve global free trade, i.e.,
it reduces the likelihood that PTAs act as building blocs. Moreover, we show that whether
or not requiring MFN on the part of the non-member country is conducive for the cause
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of global free trade depends upon the nature of the PTA in question: MFN facilitates free
trade when PTAs take the form of FTAs whereas it hinders it if they take the form of CUs.
2 Tari¤s and trade
Our underlying trade model is an appropriately adapted version of the partial equilibrium
competing exportersframework developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) to analyze the
e¤ects of PTAs. There are three asymmetrically endowed countries: i; j; and k and three
(non-numeraire) goods: I; J; andK.9 Each countrys market is served by two competing
exporters and I denotes the good that corresponds to the upper case value of i. Country i
is endowed with zero units of good I and ei units of the other two goods.
The demand for good z in country i is given by
d(pzi ) =   pzi where z = I; J; or K (1)
As is well known, the above demand functions can be derived from a utility function of the
form U(cz) = u(cz) +w where cz denotes consumption of good z; w denotes the numeraire
good; and u(cz) is quadratic and additively separable in each of the three goods. Country i
must import good I in order to consume it and it can import it from either trading partner.
Let tij be the tari¤ imposed by country i on its imports of good I from country j.
Ruling out prohibitive tari¤s yields the following no-arbitrage conditions:
pIi = p
I
j + tij = p
I
k + tik (2)
Let mIi be country is imports of good I. Since country i has no endowment of good I, we
have
mIi = d(p
I
i ) =   pIi (3)
Each countrys exports of a good must equal its endowment of that good minus its local
consumption:
xIj = ej   [  pIj ] (4)
Market clearing for good I requires that country is imports equal the total exports of the
other two countries:
mIi =
X
j 6=i
xIj (5)
9All countries have large enough endowments of the freely traded numeraire good that they consume
in positive quantities.
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Equations (2) through (5) imply that the equilibrium price of good I in country i equals:
pIi =
1
3
 
3 
X
j 6=i
ej +
X
j 6=i
tij
!
(6)
A countrys terms of trade motive for import tari¤s is evident from equation (6): only a
third of a given increase in either of its tari¤s is passed on to domestic consumers in the
form of a price increase, with the rest of the burden falling on the shoulders of foreign
exporters.
From a welfare perspective, given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, it su¢ ces
to consider only protected goods. A countrys welfare is dened as the sum of consumer
surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ revenue over all such goods:
wi =
X
z
CSzi +
X
z
PSzi + TRi (7)
Using equations (2) through (6) one can easily obtain welfare of country i as a function of
endowment levels and tari¤s. Let aggregate world welfare be dened as the sum of each
countrys welfare:
ww =
X
i
wi: (8)
Before proceeding further, we note that in order to guarantee non-negative exports and
positive tari¤s under all trade policy regimes, we impose the following parameter restriction
throughout the paper: maxfei; ej; ekg  54 minfei; ej; ekg.10
We are now ready to report the key properties of the di¤erent types of optimal tari¤s
that arise under the various trade policy regimes that can arise in our model.
Suppose countries do not enter into any type of trade agreement with each other. Then,
in the absence of an MFN clause, each country is free to tari¤ discriminate across its
trading partners. Let country is optimal discriminatory tari¤ pair be given by (tij; t

ik) 
argmaxwi(tij; tik).
When forced to abide by MFN, country i must set tij = t

ik. Let t
M
i denote country is
optimal MFN tari¤ where
tMi  argmax wi(tij; tik) such that tij = tik (9)
10Calculations supporting this restriction and all of the results reported in the paper are contained in
the appendix.
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It is straightforward to show that (see appendix), when free to tari¤ discriminate, each
country imposes a higher tari¤ on the larger exporter:
tik  tij i¤ ek  ej (10)
and that each countrys optimal MFN tari¤ is bound by its discriminatory tari¤s:
tij  tMi  tik where ej  ek (11)
Now let us consider how the formation of an FTA between two countries, say i and j,
a¤ects the non-member country. It is useful to begin with exogenously given internal and
external tari¤s and consider how variations in these tari¤s a¤ect the non-member. Let the
pair of internal tari¤s set by FTA members i and j on each other be denoted by ( ij;  ji).
Our rst point is simply that, all else equal, the non-member loses if the internal tari¤s
within the FTA decline (we call this as the discrimination e¤ect):
@wk
@ ij
> 0 and
@wk
@ ji
> 0 (12)
Consider now the relationship between internal and external tari¤s of an FTA between
countries i and j. We assume that FTA members rst choose their internal tari¤s ( ij;  ji)
to maximize their joint welfare and then, given internal tari¤s, each FTA member chooses
its external tari¤ to maximize its own welfare. Thus, as a member of a bilateral FTA with
country j, country i chooses tik to maxwi(tik;  ij).11 The optimal external tari¤ of FTA
member i as a function of its internal tari¤ on FTA member j is given by
tik( ij)  argmax
tik
wi(tik;  ij)
Using the rst order condition for the above problem, we can show the following:
dtik( ij)
d ij
> 0 (13)
i.e. the individually optimal external tari¤ of an FTA member country is increasing in its
internal tari¤ on the other member country. In other words, there is tari¤ complementarity
between the internal and external tari¤s of FTA member countries. This tari¤ complemen-
tarity implies that the deeper the degree of internal trade liberalization in an FTA, the
lower the tari¤s that FTA members impose on the non-member.
11Due to the structure of the model, a countrys individually tari¤ is independent of the tari¤s of its
trading partners (since these apply to di¤erent goods). In other words, country is choice of tik only
depends upon tij (and is independent of all other tari¤s).
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The above tari¤ analysis shows that the preferential trade liberalization undertaken by
FTA members has two conicting e¤ects on the non-member country. One the one hand,
the non-member loses from the discrimination that is inherent to FTAs. On the other hand,
the internal liberalization within an FTA induces each member to lower its tari¤on the non-
member. Furthermore, when external tari¤s are chosen by FTA members to maximize their
respective welfare, the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect outweighs the discrimination e¤ect so
that the larger the degree of internal trade liberalization between FTA members, the higher
the non-members welfare, i.e., at tik = tik( ij) and tjk = t

jk( ji) we have:
@wk
@ ij
< 0 and
@wk
@ ji
< 0
Now consider tari¤ setting within an FTA. While setting their internal tari¤s, FTA
members jointly solve
max
 ij ;  ji

wi( ij;  ji; t

ik( ij); t

jk( ji)) + wj( ij;  ji; t

ik( ij); t

jk( ji))

In other words, while setting their internal tari¤s, FTA member account for the fact that
each of them chooses an individually optimal external tari¤ subsequently. The rst order
condition for  ij when evaluated at is given by
@wi
@ ij
+
@wi
@tik
dtik( ij)
d ij
+
@wj
@ ij
+
@wj
@tik
dtik( ij)
d ij
= 0
which is the same as
@(wi + wj)
@ ij
+
dtik
d ij

@(wi + wj)
@tik

= 0 (14)
Note that
@(wi + wj)
@ ij
< 0
i.e., all else equal, an increase in country is internal tari¤ lowers the joint welfare of FTA
members but, as noted above in (13), due to tari¤ complementarity we have dt

ik
d ij
> 0.
Furthermore, at the individually optimal external tari¤ chosen by country i we have
@wi
@tik
= 0
But since @wj
@tik
> 0, it follows that at the individually optimal external tari¤ chosen by
country i we must have
@(wi + wj)
@tik
> 0
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since country i does not take into account the e¤ect of its tari¤ on its partner country,
it is jointly welfare improving for the two FTA members to raise their tari¤s above their
individually optimal tari¤s. As a result, though internal tari¤s hurt FTA members by
lowering internal trade, they also benet them by committing them to higher tari¤s on the
non-member. As a result, FTA members nd it optimal to impose positive internal tari¤s
on each other. Let the optimal internal tari¤s set by countries i and j on each other be
denoted by ( ij; 

ji).
We summarize the key messages of the above analysis in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: (i) In the absence of trade agreements, each country imposes a higher tari¤
on the partner from which it imports more under free trade: tik  tij i¤ ej  ek; (ii) a
countrys optimal MFN tari¤ is bound by its optimal discriminatory tari¤s: tij  tMi  tik
where ej  ek; (iii) the larger the degree of internal trade liberalization undertaken by FTA
members, the higher the welfare of the non-member country; and (iv) FTA members impose
strictly positive internal tari¤s on each other, i.e.  ij > 0 and 

ji > 0.
The intuition behind the rst two results reported in Lemma 1 is already well-established
in the literature  see, for example, Saggi (2004 and 2009). As noted above, the result
in part (iii) obtains because the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect of an FTA dominates its
discrimination e¤ect. The intuition behind part (iv) is rather subtle and is as follows. Due
to the lack of external tari¤ coordination in an FTA, each FTA member does not take
into account the fact that an increase in its external tari¤ benets its FTA partner whose
exports compete with those of the non-member. Thus, the individually optimal external
tari¤s of FTA members are too low from the perspective of maximizing their joint welfare.
But the coordination of internal tari¤s that occurs prior to the setting of external tari¤s
provides FTA members with a partial remedy to this problem. Due to the existence of tari¤
complementarity, while setting their internal tari¤s, FTA members deliberately choose to
set positive internal tari¤s on each other: doing so commits each of them to imposing
a higher external tari¤ on the non-member country thereby bringing their individually
optimal external tari¤s closer to jointly optimal ones.
To conrm the role that tari¤ coordination plays in generating positive internal tari¤s
within an FTA, suppose FTA members can coordinate both internal and external tari¤s,
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as they might be able to do under a customs union (CU). Then, members solve12
max
 ij ;  ji; tik; tjk
[wi( ij;  ji; tik; tjk) + wj( ij;  ji; tik; tjk)]
Since tari¤s of di¤erent countries apply to di¤erent goods, it su¢ ces to focus on the choice
of  ij and tik. Di¤erentiating the objective function with respect to  ij we have
@(wi + wj)
@ ij
< 0
If external tari¤s can also be coordinated, and FTA becomes equivalent to a CU in our
model and its members nd it optimal to engage in free internal trade since their joint
welfare is strictly decreasing in each of the internal tari¤s. The optimal external tari¤ tuik
of the CU between i and j dened, as usual, by @(wi+wj)
@tik
= 0. It is straightforward to
show that CU members impose higher external tari¤s than FTA members: tuzk > t

zk where
z = i; j: Thus, due to the dual coordination of internal and external tari¤s, a CU between
two countries yields (i) deeper internal trade liberalization and (ii) higher external tari¤s
than an FTA between them.
3 Endogenous trade agreements
The three scenarios that we contrast are formalized as follows.
(a)WTO-consistent scenario: This scenario is captured by a three stage game of trade
liberalization under which countries abide by both Article I and Article XXIV of GATT. In
the rst stage, countries enter into FTAs with one another (the process of FTA formation
is described in greater detail below).13 In the second stage, given the trade policy regime
that results from the rst stage, countries choose their tari¤s. If an FTA is formed, its
members practice free internal trade while imposing individually optimal external tari¤s
on the non-member who, in accordance with MFN, imposes non-discriminatory tari¤s on
the two member countries. At the third stage of the game, given trade agreements and
tari¤s, international trade and consumption take place.
(b) Unconstrained preferential liberalization scenario: This scenario is formalized as a
four stage game that proceeds as follows. The rst stage of the game remains the same
as the rst stage of the WTO-consistent scenario while its second stage di¤ers. At the
12When both external and internal tari¤s are coordinated, the tari¤ problem compresses to a single
stage.
13Our approach to endogenous trade agreements follows Saggi and Yildiz (2010). For the benet of
readers who are unfamiliar with this approach, we describe it in greater detail below.
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second stage, given the policy regime, FTA members set their internal tari¤s with the goal
of maximizing their joint welfare. As opposed to (a), the internal tari¤ does not have to be
zero. Next, all countries simultaneously choose their individually optimal external tari¤s.
At the last stage of the game, international trade and consumption occur.
(c) Tari¤ discrimination scenario: This scenario di¤ers from the WTO-consistent
benchmark in only one way: at the second stage of the game, the non-member country
is free to impose discriminatory tari¤s on FTA members as opposed to having to treat
them in an MFN manner. Thus, all countries engage in some type of tari¤ discrimination:
FTA members discriminate against the non-member by imposing higher tari¤s on it than
they do on each other while the non-member discriminates between them by imposing a
higher tari¤ on the country from whom it imports more.
We now describe the process of FTA formation that comprises the rst stage of the
game that is common to all three scenarios.
The process of FTA formation: At the rst stage of the game, each country announces
whether or not it wants to sign an FTA with each of the other two countries. Denote
country is announcement by i and its strategy set by Si where
Si = ff; g; fj; g; f; kg; fj; kgg (15)
In Si, f; g denotes an announcement in favor of no FTAs, fj; g an announcement in
favor of an FTA with only country j; f; kg in favor of an FTA with only country k; and
fj; kg in favor of FTAs with both of them. Since a trade agreement requires consent from
both sides, we posit the following mapping between various announcements proles and
the types of trade agreements that countries can form:
(i) No two announcements match or the only matching announcements are f; g. All
of these announcement proles yield no agreement hi wherein all countries impose their
optimal discriminatory Nash tari¤s on one another.
(ii) Two countries announce each others name and there is no other matching an-
nouncement: i.e., j 2 i and i 2 j while i =2 k and/or k =2 i and j =2 k and/or
k =2 j. All of these announcements yield an FTA between countries i and j denoted by
hiji under which members impose their jointly optimal internal tari¤s on each other and
their individually optimal external tari¤s on the non-member.
(iii) Country i announces in favor of signing an FTA with countries j and k while
countries j and/or k announce only in favor of signing an FTA with country i: i.e. i =
fj; kg; i 2 j; and i 2 k while k =2 j and/or j =2 k. This set of announcements yields
a pair of independent FTAs (i.e. a hub and spoke trading regime) with i as the common
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member denoted by hij; iki (or simply hihi). Under a hub and spoke agreement hihi,
country i sets zero tari¤s on both spokes while the spokes solve the same tari¤ problems
as they do under a bilateral FTA with country i.
(iv) All countries announce each othersnames, i.e., the announcement prole is 
F 
fi = fj; kg; j = fi; kg; k = fi; jgg. This announcement prole yields global free trade
hF i.
Note that since an FTA between two countries can arise only if it is mutually acceptable
to both sides, multiple announcement proles can map into the same agreement. For
example, the FTA hiji obtains when (i) countries i and j call only each other, regardless of
the nature of country ks announcement: if i = fj; g and j = fi; g, then hiji obtains
for all four possible announcements on the part of country k, i.e., for k = f; g, fi; g,
f; jg and fi; jg so that country ks announcement has no bearing upon the outcome when
neither of the other two countriesannounce its name; (ii) countries i and j announce each
others name and either one or both of them also announce country k but country k does
not reciprocate: i.e. all of the following types of announcements map into the FTA hiji:
(a) i = fj; kg and j = fi; g but i =2 k or (b) i = fj; g and j = fi; kg but j =2 k or
(c) i = fj; kg and j = fi; kg but k = f; g.
When analyzing the above games, we only consider those Nash equilibria that are
coalition-proof. Following Bernheim et al. (1987): ... an agreement is coalition-proof
if and only if it is Pareto e¢ cient within the class of self-enforcing agreements. In turn,
an agreement is self-enforcing if and only if no proper subset (coalition) of players, taking
the actions of its complement as xed, can agree to deviate in a way that makes all of
its members better o¤.Therefore, a coalition proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) is a Nash
equilibrium that is immune to all self-enforcing coalitional deviations.
4 Equilibrium agreements
In order to simplify exposition, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: Countries l and l0 are larger importers than country s: es = e  el =
el0 = e where 1    5=4.14
It is worth pointing out here that, in our model, all countries have the ability to manip-
14The qualitative nature of our results is robust to a scenario where all three countries are asymmetric,
such as when es = se  em = me  el = e. But since the key insights can be illustrated more easily
in the simpler case where the two larger countries are symmetric, in what follows we proceed with this
assumption.
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ulate their terms of trade via import tari¤s. Country s has a weaker ability to manipulate
its terms of trade but its not a smallcountry in the traditional sense of the term wherein
it would be a price-taker on world markets.
We proceed as follows. First, we study FTA formation in our WTO-consistent bench-
mark scenario and show that, in this scenario, no two countries have an incentive to form a
bilateral trade agreement aimed at excluding the third country. Instead, it is the strength
of the free-riding incentive of the non-member country that proves pivotal in determin-
ing whether or not global free trade obtains in equilibrium. Next, we derive equilibrium
trade agreements under unrestricted preferential liberalization scenario where FTA mem-
bers are free to impose positive internal tari¤s on each other. In equilibrium, FTA members
utilize this freedom and they end up imposing higher external tari¤s relative to the WTO-
consistent benchmark where they are forced to eliminate internal tari¤s. This in turn
reduces the free-riding incentive of the non-member country and therefore furthers the
cause of global free trade. On the other hand, when global free trade is infeasible, the free
internal trade requirement of Article XXIV raises global welfare by lowering internal and
external tari¤s of FTA countries. Finally, we examine the tari¤ discrimination scenario
under which the non-member country is free to tari¤ discriminate between FTA members.
We show that the welfare benets of the MFN clause depend on whether the non-member
voluntarily stays out of the FTA between the other two countries or has been deliberately
excluded by them.
4.1 WTO-consistent agreements
In this section, we derive equilibrium trade agreements under our benchmark scenario where
countries follow both Articles I and XXIV of GATT i.e. the non-member country follows
MFN and FTA members engage in free internal trade. Let country is welfare as a function
of the underlying trade policy regime r be denoted by wi(r), where r = hi,hiji ; hihi, or
hF i and it is understood that all countries impose optimal tari¤s consistent with regime r.
For example, if r = hiji then countries i and j impose the optimal internal tari¤s  ij and
 ji on each other respectively while imposing the tari¤s t

ik(

ij) and t

jk(

ji) on country k.
Let wi(r  v) denote the di¤erence between country is welfare under trade agreements r
and v: wi(r   v)  wi(r)  wi(v), where r; v = hi,hiji ; hihi, or hF i.
We rst state the following lemma that explains how di¤erences in market power across
countries lead them to have asymmetric preferences over various trade regimes:
Lemma 2: In the WTO-consistent approach to the formation of trade agreements, the
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following holds:
(i) Each country prefers to form a bilateral FTA with the larger importer relative
to the smaller one: wl(ll0   sl) > 0 for all .
(ii) The smaller importer (s) has an incentive to form an additional bilateral FTA
under any trade regime except for when it is a non-member facing an FTA between the
other two countries.
(iii) Each larger importer prefers being a non-member under a bilateral FTA to
being a spoke under a hub and spoke regime while the smaller importer does so only when the
degree of endowment asymmetry is su¢ ciently small: wl0(lh sl) < 0 andwl0(sh sl) <
0 for all  and ws(lh  ll0) < 0 when  < s(lh  ll0).
(iv) All countries prefer being the hub under a hub and spoke regime relative to all
other trade policy regimes: wi(ih   ) > 0; wi(ih   F ) > 0 and wi(ih   ij) > 0 for
all i = s; l; l0.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 follows from two reinforcing e¤ects. The larger a countrys trad-
ing partners import volume, the larger the increase in export surplus it enjoys from the
elimination of its partners optimal tari¤ and the smaller the loss it su¤ers from its own
trade liberalization since its tari¤ reduction applies to a smaller volume of imports. Thus,
a country prefers to form a bilateral FTA with the larger importer amongst its two trading
partners. The second part of Lemma 1 argues that the smaller importer (i.e. country
s) has an incentive to form an additional FTA under any given regime except when the
existing regime is hll0i and the endowment asymmetry is su¢ ciently large (see part (iii)).
This implies that, generally speaking, the larger importing countrys choice is critical in
determining whether or not an FTA between two asymmetric countries arises. Finally,
part (iv) says that being a hub country is better for all countries irrespective of their size
relative to all other trade policy regimes. Note in particular that, relative to free trade, the
hub country enjoys privileged access in both spoke countries while its domestic surplus is
no di¤erent. Moreover, this privileged access in export markets is so desirable that a hub
country has no incentive to unilaterally revoke either or both of its FTAs.
While members of an FTA discriminate against the non-member country, we know
from the above tari¤ analysis that the internal trade liberalization undertaken by FTA
partners actually benets the non-member. This raises the possibility that, starting from
no agreement hi, the formation of an FTA makes all countries better o¤ (i.e. is Pareto
improving relative to hi). Indeed, we can show that the smaller country benets from
the formation of an FTA between large countries only when the degree of endowment
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asymmetry is su¢ ciently small:
ws(ll
0   ) > 0 when  < s(ll0   ) (16)
Second, while the larger non-member (country l0) always benets from the formation of
hsli, the larger member country benets from the formation of hsli only when the degree
of asymmetry is su¢ ciently small:
wl0(sl   ) > 0 when  < l(sl   ) (17)
Therefore, we nd the following:
Proposition 1: Relative to no agreement hi wherein all countries impose their optimal
Nash tari¤s on each other, the FTA hll0i is Pareto-improving i¤  < s(ll0   ) while the
the FTA hsli is Pareto-improving i¤  < l(sl   ).
Armed with the underlying incentives identied by Lemma 2, we are now ready to
determine the CPNE of the WTO-consistent game of trade agreement formation. We
proceed by considering each of the announcement proles that yield the various trade policy
regimes in turn. First, consider the announcement prole leading to global free trade hF i.
First note from part (ii) of the Lemma 2 that smaller importer (i.e. country s) has no
incentive to participate in any deviation (unilateral or coalitional). Thus, if there exists a
coalitional deviation, it must involve countries l and l0. Taking country sannouncement
xed at fl; l0g, countries l and l0 have an incentive to jointly deviate from their respective
announcements fs; l0g and fs; lg to f; l0g and f; lg in order to exclude country s from a
free trade network when country s is su¢ ciently small:
wl(F   ll0) < 0 when  > l(F   ll0) (18)
The above result establishes the existence of an exclusion incentive: when the endowment
asymmetry is su¢ ciently pronounced (i.e.  > l(F   ll0)) the two larger importers prefer
a bilateral FTA between themselves to global free trade. Furthermore, since world welfare
under free trade is higher than that under a bilateral FTA, it follows that the non-member
country is better o¤ under free trade relative to the bilateral FTA hiji.
The key question is whether the joint exclusion incentive of the two larger importers is
self-enforcing or not. The answer to this question turns out to be in the negative. To see
why, suppose each country announces in favor of an FTA with both its trading partners.
Starting with these announcements the two larger importers have an incentive to exclude
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the smaller country by jointly altering their announcements such that the announcement
prole changes from
F (which yields free trade) to
ll
0
1 = fl = f; l0g; l0 = f; lg; s = fl; l0gg
thereby altering the associated trade regime from free trade to the bilateral FTA hll0i.
However, from part (iv) of Lemma 2 we know that each countrys most preferred trading
arrangement is a hub and spoke regime with itself as the hub. It follows then that, holding
constant the announcement of the excluded country at s = fl; l0g, each member of the
deviating coalition (l or l0) has an incentive to alter its announcement so as to include coun-
try s. For example, country l has an incentive to alter its announcement from l = f; l0g
to l = fs; l0g which alters the trade regime from hll0i to hlhi. Since the welfare of a hub
is higher than that of a member country in a single FTA see part (iv) of Lemma 2 
the original coalitional deviation of countries l and l0 from 
F to 
ll
0
1 is not self-enforcing.
Thus, in a nutshell, the lure of a hub and spoke trading arrangement makes any joint devi-
ation from 
F to an announcement prole that supports a bilateral FTA between any two
countries not-self enforcing.
Consider now announcement deviations that convert the trade regime from hF i to hi.
It is easy to see that since all countries are better o¤ under free trade relative to hi, no
two countries have an incentive to deviate from 
F to an announcement prole that yields
hi. For example, holding s = fl; l0g, countries l and l0 have no incentive to jointly deviate
from their respective announcements fs; l0g and fs; lg to f; g and f; g. Based on the
above discussion, the only possible type of self-enforcing deviation from 
F that we need
to consider is a unilateral deviation from 
F by one of the large importers. To this end, we
nd that there exists no incentive of a large country (say l) to unilaterally deviate from its
announcements fs; l0g to any announcement that leads to a hub and spoke regime under
which country s is a hub and it itself is a spoke:
wl(F   sh) = wl0(F   sh)  0 for all  (19)
Then two unilateral deviation incentives remain to be examined: (i) country l unilaterally
deviates from fs; l0g to f; l0g:
wl(F   l0h) = wl0(F   lh) < 0 when  > l(F   l0h) (20)
and (ii) country l unilaterally deviates from fs; l0g to f; g:
wl(F   sl0) = wl0(F   sl) < 0 when  > l(F   sl0) (21)
We nd that l(F   sl0) < l(F   l0h) and thus the announcement prole leading to hF i is
CPNE whenever   l(F   sl0).
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What if hF i is not a CPNE, as is the case when  > l(F   sl0)? We can quickly rule
out the various announcement proles leading to the hub and spoke regimes as candidates
for CPNE. To see why, recall from part (iii) of Lemma 2 that a larger spoke country
(say l) under hshi and hl0hi has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its respective
announcements fs; g and f; l0g to f; g and f; g, leading to a deviation from hshi
to hsl0i and from hl0hi to hsl0i. Since these unilateral deviations are self-enforcing, any
announcement prole leading to a hub and spoke regime cannot be a CPNE.
Next, we consider the various announcement proles that lead to no agreement hi.
Since countries l and l0 have an incentive to jointly deviate from their respective announce-
ments f; g and f; g to f; l0g and f; lg in order to form hll0i, this joint deviation is
self-enforcing. As a result, any announcement prole that yields hi cannot be a CPNE.
The only remaining candidates for CPNE are the announcement proles that lead to
bilateral FTAs. We start with those proles that yield an FTA between the smaller importer
and one of the larger ones, say hsli). We nd that, when  > l(sl   ), country l has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from its announcement fs; g to f; g thereby converting
the trade policy regime from the bilateral FTA hsli to no agreement hi. Second, we
know from part (iv) of Lemma 2 that the coalitional announcement deviation leading that
converts hsli to hll0i is not self-enforcing since the common member country (i.e. country
l) has an incentive to further deviate to become the hub country, taking the announcement
of its complement as xed. Third, note from the above discussion that the coalitional
announcement deviation that replaces hsli by hF i is self-enforcing only when   l(F sl0).
Finally, it is immediate from the part (iii) of Lemma 2 that country l0 has no incentive to
engage in any coalitional announcement deviations that replace hsli by hshi or hsli by hlhi.
As a result, the announcement prole leading to hsli is a CPNE whenever l(F   sl0) 
  l(sl   ).
Finally, we consider the bilateral FTA between the two larger countries, i.e., hll0i. First,
as before, the coalitional announcement deviation from hll0i to hF i occurs   l(F ll0) and
it is self-enforcing when   l(F   sl0). Second, we can show that when  > s(lh   ll0)
country s and either of the larger countries (say l) have an incentive to jointly deviate
from their respective announcements f; g and f; l0g to fl; g and fs; l0g, leading to a
deviation from hll0i to hlhi and this deviation is self-enforcing. Since s(lh ll0) < l(F sl0),
these self-enforcing announcement deviations cover the entire parameter space and thus the
announcement prole supporting hll0i is not a CPNE.
We summarize the main ndings of the above analysis below:
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Proposition 2: The coalition-proof Nash equilibria of the WTO-consistent game of
trade liberalization where FTA members have to practice free internal trade and the non-
member has to abide by MFN are as follows:
(i) Free trade hF i is the equilibrium agreement when   l(F   sl0).15
(ii) An asymmetric bilateral FTA hsli (or hsl0i) is the equilibrium when l(F   sl0) 
  l(sl   ).
(iii) There exists no equilibrium if  > l(sl   ).
Insert Figure 1
The above proposition relates the degree of underlying asymmetry to the nature of
equilibrium agreements. Part (i) simply says that if the degree of endowment asymmetry
is su¢ ciently small, free trade is the equilibrium outcome. It is important to reiterate
that while the exclusion incentives of larger importing countries go unexercised in equi-
librium, each large importing countrys incentive to unilaterally deviate from free trade
proves critical for determining the viability of free trade. Part (ii) says that if the degree
of endowment asymmetry is su¢ ciently large, only an asymmetric FTA (hsli or hsl0i) is
an equilibrium in such a situation, one of the larger importing countries prefers being
a non-member to participating in any bilateral or multilateral agreements. Note from the
above discussion that the bilateral FTA between the two larger countries hll0i fails to arise
in equilibrium. Finally, part (iii) of Proposition 1 says that there exists no CPNE if the
degree of endowment asymmetry is very large. In such a situation, our theory o¤ers no
guidance regarding which of the trade regimes should be expected to arise in equilibrium.
What if Article XXIV allows for positive internal tari¤s? Next we allow this possibility.
4.2 Equilibrium agreements with internal tari¤s
Here, we consider the scenario of unconstrained preferential liberalization wherein FTA
member countries jointly choose their internal tari¤s before setting their individually op-
timal external tari¤s. Recall that, due to the existence of tari¤ complementarity in our
model, the deeper the internal trade liberalization in an FTA, the lower the external tari¤s
15We should note here that, technically speaking, the equilibrium is an the announcement prole 
F
that yields free trade as the agreement. In what follows, for expositional ease, we state our results directly
in terms of various trade agreements that emerge as equilibrium outcomes as opposed to the announcement
proles that support them.
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of member countries. As a result, when allowed, member countries set positive internal
tari¤s on trade from each other and due to incomplete internal trade liberalization tari¤
complementarity is smaller relative to the case with free internal trade requirement.
Under a hub and spoke agreement hihi, country i has a trade agreement with both
countries j and k and its internal tari¤s are chosen to maximize the joint welfare of all
three countries which leads to zero internal tari¤s on its part:  ij(ih) = 

ik(ih) = 0,
while the spoke countriestari¤s solve the same problem as they do under a bilateral trade
agreement so that tjk(ih) = t

jk(ij).
Let country is welfare as a function of the underlying trade agreement r with positive
internal tari¤s be denoted by wi(br) and letwi(br bv) denote the di¤erence between country
is welfare under trade agreements r and v with positive internal tari¤s: wi(br   bv) 
wi(br)  wi(bv). The following lemma explains the preferences of asymmetric countries over
trade regimes when member countries are able to impose internal tari¤s before setting their
external tari¤s:
Lemma 3: When member countries of an FTA choose their internal tari¤s jointly
before setting their individually optimal external tari¤s, the following hold:
(i) Starting from no agreement hi, all countries have an incentive to form a
bilateral FTA: wi(bij   ) > 0 for all  and i; j = s; l; l0.
(ii) A large importer prefers a bilateral FTA with the other larger importer relative
to the smaller one: wl(bll0   bsl) > 0 for all .
(iii) The smaller importer has an incentive to form a bilateral FTA under any trade
regime.
(iv) Each larger importer prefers being a non-member under a bilateral FTA to be-
ing a spoke under a hub and spoke regime provided endowments are su¢ ciently asymmetric
across countries: wl(cl0h  csl0) < 0 when  > l(cl0h  csl0) and wl(csh  csl0) < 0 when
 > l(csh csl0).
(v) All countries prefer being the hub country under a hub and spoke regime relative
to no agreement as well as to being a member under a bilateral FTA: wi( bih ) > 0 and
wi( bih  bij) > 0 for all i = s; l; l0.
The intuition behind part (i) of Lemma 3 is that when member countries under a bilat-
eral FTA can coordinate internal tari¤s before setting their individually optimal external
tari¤s, they partially internalize the e¤ects of their external tari¤s on one another and
this increases the incentive of larger importing countries to form a bilateral FTA. We nd
21
that, relative to the WTO-consistent benchmark case, the incentives for forming FTAs are
generally stronger under constrained preferential liberalization since FTA members are less
constrained and can therefore achieve higher levels of welfare under FTAs. Furthermore,
due to joint determination of internal tari¤s, a countrys preference to form a bilateral FTA
with the larger of its two trading partners is even stronger. Parts (iii) and (iv) of Lemma
3 di¤er from part (ii) and part (iii) of Lemma 2 in an important way: while coordinating
their internal tari¤s, FTA members deliberately choose to set positive internal tari¤s: do-
ing so leads each member to impose a higher external tari¤ on the non-member country
relative to our WTO-consistent benchmark case. This in turn decreases the incentive of
countries to stay outside FTAs, whether as a non-member facing a bilateral FTA or as a
spoke under a hub ad spoke regime. Finally, part (v) of Lemma 3 says that being a hub
country is better for all countries (irrespective of their size) relative to no agreement and
to being a member of a bilateral FTA.
An interesting question is whether bilateral FTA formation is more or less likely to
be Pareto-improving over no agreement when FTA members are free to impose positive
internal tari¤s on each other. Since tari¤ complementarity is weaker when FTA members
are not constrained by Article XXIV, the non-member countrys relative situation is worse
o¤ under the unconstrained liberalization scenario relative to the WTO-consistent bench-
mark scenario. As indicated above, since member countries always benet from forming an
FTA relative to no agreement, the Pareto-improvement condition of a bilateral FTA with
internal tari¤s relies only on the welfare preference of the non-member country. We rst
nd that, starting from no agreement, a larger country always benets from the formation
of an FTA between the other two countries:
wl0(bsl   ) > 0 for all  (22)
Second, as under the WTO-consistent benchmark case, the small country benets from the
formation of an FTA between the two larger countries only when the degree of asymmetry
is su¢ ciently small:
ws(bll0   ) > 0 when  < s(bll0   ) (23)
A comparison of conditions in (16) and (23) yields
s(bll0   ) < s(ll0   )
implying that the formation of dhll0i is less likely to be Pareto improving relative to hll0i.
We have:
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Proposition 3: (i) Relative to no agreement hi, an unconstrained FTA between two
asymmetric countries dhsli is necessarily Pareto-improving whereas the unconstrained FTA
between the two larger importers dhll0i is Pareto-improving only when  < s(bll0   ). (ii)
The freedom to set positive internal tari¤s in a coordinated fashion makes the FTA between
two asymmetric partners more likely to be Pareto-improving while the opposite is true for
the FTA between the two larger importers.
We are now ready to derive equilibria under the game of unrestricted preferential lib-
eralization. First note, it is immediate from part (i) of Lemma 3 that any two countries
have an incentive to jointly deviate from their respective announcements under hi to an-
nouncement proles leading to a bilateral FTA. Since this deviation is self-enforcing, hi
is not an equilibrium.
Next, we consider the announcement proles leading to dhll0i. It is immediate from part
(iii) and part (v) of the Lemma 3 that, taking the announcement prole of a large country
(say l0) as given, country s and either of the large member countries (say l) have incentives
to jointly deviate from their respective announcements f; g and f; l0g to fl; g and
fs; l0g, leading to a deviation from dhll0i to dhlhi and this deviation is self enforcing. As a
result, the announcement prole leading to dhll0i is never a CPNE.
Next, we consider the announcement prole leading to global free trade hF i. As in
the benchmark case, note from part (iii) of Lemma 2 that any deviation (unilateral or
coalitional) from hF i does not involve country s. Thus, if there exists a coalitional deviation,
it must be by countries l and l0. Similar to the benchmark WTO case, when countries have
the ability to set positive internal tari¤s, large countries still have incentives to exclude the
small country. In other words, taking country sannouncement xed fl; l0g, countries l and
l0 have incentives to jointly deviate from their respective announcements fs; l0g and fs; lg
to f; l0g and f; lg in order exclude country s from a free trade network when country s
is su¢ ciently small:
wl(F   bll0) < 0 when  > l(F   bll0) (24)
The following result is based on the comparison of the exclusion incentives contained in
(18) and (24):
Lemma 4: The larger importers have a stronger incentive to exclude the smaller
country from their mutual trade agreement under the unconstrained preferential liberal-
ization scenario under which they impose positive internal tari¤s on each other relative to
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the WTO-consistent benchmark where they are required to fully liberalize internal trade:
l(F   bll0) < l(F   ll0).
We next argue that, as under the benchmark WTO case, the exible nature of FTAs
ensures that the exclusion incentive goes unexercised even when countries are able to impose
positive internal tari¤s on each other. To see why, suppose each country announces in favor
of an FTA with both its trading partners. Part (v) of Lemma 2 informs us that a hub
and spoke regime dhlhi is a preferred regime for the hub country relative to being a member
under dhll0i. It follows then that, holding constant the announcement of the excluded small
country at s = fl; l0g, each member of the deviating coalition (l or l0) has an incentive
to alter its announcement to form a separate FTA with the excluded country. As a result,
the original coalitional deviation of countries l and l0 is not self-enforcing and thus the lure
of a hub and spoke trading arrangement ends up undermining the exclusion incentives as
before.
Next, taking country sannouncement as xed fl; l0g, countries l and l0 have no incen-
tives to jointly deviate from their respective announcements of fs; l0g and fs; lg to f; g
and f; g, leading to a deviation from hF i to hi. As before, the only possible self-
enforcing deviation is the unilateral deviation of the either large importer from free trade.
To this end, we nd that, when the degree of asymmetry is su¢ ciently large, a large country
(say l) has incentive to unilaterally deviate from its announcements fs; l0g to an announce-
ment leading to a hub and spoke regime where the small country or the other large country
is a hub and it itself is a spoke:
wl(F  csh) < 0 when  > l(F  csh) (25)
and
wl(F  cl0h) < 0 when  > l(F  cl0h) (26)
where l(F   sh) < l(F   l0h). Then, the unilateral deviation incentive that remains to
be examined is the unilateral deviation of a large country (say l) from fs; l0g to f; g:
wl(F  csl0) = wl0(F   bsl) < 0 when  > l(F  csl0) (27)
We nd that l(F  csl0) < l(F  csh) holds and thus the announcement prole leading to
hF i is CPNE when   l(F  csl0).
We next examine the hub and spoke regimes. From part (iv) of Lemma 3, we know that
a large spoke country (say l) under dhshi and dhl0hi has an incentive to unilaterally deviate
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from its respective announcements fs; g and f; l0g to f; g and f; g, leading to a
deviation from dhshi to dhsl0i and from dhl0hi to dhsl0i when small country is su¢ ciently small
and l(cl0h  csl0) < l(csh  csl0). Moreover, when  < l(cl0h  csl0), the joint announcement
deviations of small and large countries leading to deviations from hub and spoke regimes
to free trade are self-enforcing. Thus, the announcement proles leading to any hub and
spoke regime is never a CPNE.
The only remaining candidate for CPNE is the announcement prole leading to dhsli.
We know from part (i) of Lemma 3 that no country has an incentive to unilaterally deviate
from its announcement leading to a deviation from dhsli to hi. Second, we know from
part (v) that the coalitional announcement deviation leading to a deviation from dhsli
and dhll0i is not self-enforcing since the common member country (l here) always has an
incentive to further deviate to become the hub country, taking the announcement of its
complement xed. Third, note from the above discussion that the coalitional announcement
deviation leading a deviation fromdhsli to hF i is self-enforcing only when   l(F  csl0).
When  > l(F  csl0) holds, the non-member country l0 has no incentive to engage in any
coalitional announcement deviations that lead to a deviation fromdhsli to dhshi or fromdhsli
to dhlhi. As a result, we argue that the announcement prole leading to dhsli is a CPNE
when   l(F  csl0).
The following result is immediate:
Proposition 4: The coalition-proof Nash equilibria of the game of unrestricted pref-
erential liberalization under which FTA member countries coordinate their internal tari¤s
before setting their individually optimal external tari¤s are as follows: if   l(F  csl0),
free trade is the equilibrium outcome; otherwise, it is the asymmetric FTA dhsli (or dhsl0i).
Insert Figure 2
A comparison of Propositions 2 and 4 yields the following result:
Proposition 5: (i) For   l(F   sl0), the equilibrium outcome is free trade whether
or not FTA members are required to practice free internal trade whereas over l(F   sl0) <
  l(F  csl0) it is the equilibrium only if FTA members are free to set positive internal
tari¤s on each other.
(ii) When free trade is out of reach, i.e. when  > l(F  csl0), the free internal trade
requirement of Article XXIV increases world welfare by yielding (weakly) lower global tari¤s.
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Insert Figure 3
The above proposition argues that, when the degree of endowment asymmetry is suf-
ciently small, free trade arises regardless of whether or not FTA members are required
to engage in free internal trade. However, when the degree of endowment asymmetry is
moderate, free trade arises only when FTA members are free to impose positive internal
tari¤s on each other. In other words, the free internal trade requirement of GATTs Article
XXIV hinders the cause of global free trade. To understand this result, we should rst
note that the viability of free trade is determined by the unilateral deviation incentive of
one of the larger importers regardless of whether FTA members are required to engage in
free internal trade or not. Due to the presence of tari¤ complementarity, the freedom to
set positive internal tari¤s leads FTA members to impose higher external tari¤s which in
turn makes it less attractive for one of the larger importers to opt out of global free trade 
i.e. its incentive to free ride on the external trade liberalization of FTA members without
having to o¤er any trade liberalization of its own is reduced. Finally, when free trade is out
of reach, the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV acts as a disciplining device
in a tari¤-ridden world and it helps protect the interest of non-member country by leading
FTA members to adopt lower external tari¤s. Thus, our overall message is as follows:
when circumstances are such that achieving complete global free trade is not possible, the
free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV increases world welfare by reducing both
internal and external tari¤s of FTAs but, at the same time, it also reduces the likelihood
of reaching global free trade. From a practical perspective, given the multitude of ways in
which countries can prevent the obtainment of global free trade, it would seem that the
benecial e¤ects of Article XXIVs free internal trade requirement for FTAs are likely to
be of greater real-world relevance than their negative e¤ect on the prospects of achieving
global free trade.
4.3 Equilibrium agreements under tari¤ discrimination
While Article XXIV of GATT sanctions tari¤discrimination in the form of FTAs, the MFN
principle requires WTO members to treat all other members (with whom they do not have
FTAs) in a non-discriminatory fashion. A natural question is whether there is a case for
imposing the MFN constraint on the tari¤-setting behavior of countries trading with FTAs
whose members actively discriminate against them. This concern would appear to be even
more acute for the case of a country that nds itself deliberately excluded from an FTA.
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To address these issues, we now analyze our tari¤ discrimination scenario under which a
country trading with member countries of an FTA is free to set its optimal discriminatory
tari¤s on them as opposed to having to treat them in a non-discriminatory fashion. To
isolate the role of MFN, we assume that, under the tari¤ discrimination scenario, FTA
countries have to abide by GATT Article XXIV that obligates them to eliminate internal
tari¤s.
The structure of a countrys optimal discriminatory tari¤s and their relationship to its
optimal MFN tari¤ is described in Lemma 1. As this lemma indicates, when free to tari¤
discriminate across its trading partners, a country sets a higher tari¤ on the country from
whom it sources a larger volume of imports (i.e. the one whose endowment is larger). Using
these optimal tari¤s, we can calculate each countrys welfare under various trade regimes.
Let country is welfare a function of the underlying trade agreement r with free inter-
nal trade between FTA members and optimal discriminatory tari¤s on the part of non-
member(s) be denoted by wi(er). As before, let wi(er   ev)  wi(er)   wi(ev). Here, it
is important to note that only the tari¤s of larger importers under no agreement ghi,
and the external tari¤s of the non-member country underghsli are di¤erent relative to the
benchmark WTO case. Therefore, the welfare levels change only under those regimes.
To avoid redundancy, we directly state the following result:
Proposition 6: The following hold under tari¤ discrimination:
(i) While the FTA between the two larger importers ghll0i is always Pareto-improving over
no agreement hi, the asymmetric FTAghsli is Pareto-improving only when  < l(esl  e).
(ii) While the symmetric FTA between the two larger importers ghll0i is more likely to be
Pareto-improving over no agreement relative to the WTO-consistent benchmark case , the
opposite is true for the the asymmetric FTA ghsli.
Following the analysis under the previous two scenarios, we can derive equilibrium
outcomes under tari¤ discrimination and compare them with those obtained under the
WTO-consistent benchmark case. For brevity, we directly state the main result (proof is
in the appendix):
Proposition 7: For   l(F  fsl0) free trade is the equilibrium outcome under both
tari¤ discrimination and the WTO-consistent benchmark. When l(F  fsl0) <   l(F  
sl0), the WTO-consistent benchmark yields free trade whereas tari¤ discrimination yields
an asymmetric FTA (i.e. ghsli or ghsl0i). Finally, when  > l(F   sl0), free trade is out of
reach under both scenarios but world welfare is lower under tari¤ discrimination.
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The above analysis provides strong support for the MFN principle. Not only does the
MFN constraint make it easier to achieve global free trade, it also delivers a welfare-superior
outcome when global free trade cannot be reached due to the high degree of asymmetry
in the underlying economic environment. Yet, the above analysis cannot shed light on the
e¤ects of MFN when a bilateral agreement emerges because members deliberately exclude
the third country since such an incentive on the part of members only arises when they can
coordinate their external tari¤s. Accordingly, in the nal part of the paper, we discuss the
case where the bilateral trade agreement is a customs union (CU) as opposed to an FTA.
4.4 Agreements with external tari¤ coordination
Suppose the PTA under consideration is a CU under which member countries coordinate
both internal and external tari¤s as opposed to an FTA wherein they only coordinate
internal tari¤s.
Now consider the endogenous formation of CUs. As under the FTA game, at the rst
stage of the CU formation game each country announces the names of countries with whom
it wants to form a CU. Country is announcement is denoted by i and its strategy set Siu
consists of four possible announcements:
Siu = ff; g; fju; g; f; kug; fju; kugg (28)
where f; g denotes an announcement in favor of no CU with either trading partners,
fju; g in favor of a CU with only country j; f; kug in favor of a CU with only country k;
and fju; kug in favor of a CU that includes both its trading partners.
The mapping between various announcements proles and the CUs that can arise is as
follows: (i) when no two announcements match or the only matching announcements are
f; g we obtain no agreement hi; (ii) a CU between countries i and j denoted by hijui
is formed if two countries announce each othersnames and there is no other matching
announcement: i.e. hijui is formed if ju 2 i, iu 2 j and both (a) ku =2 i and/or iu =2 k
and (b) ku =2 j and/or ju =2 k hold; (iv) if all countriesannounce each others names,
global trade agreement hF i obtains. Note that a hub and spoke type trading regime cannot
arise under the CU game due to the fact that CU members coordinate their external tari¤s.
Under no agreement hi, the optimal MFN and discriminatory tari¤s in the CU game
are the same as that in the FTA game. However, as indicated earlier, CU members nd it
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optimal to engage in free internal trade since their joint welfare is strictly decreasing in each
of the internal tari¤s. Thus, the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV does not
bind for CU members. Furthermore, recall that CU members impose higher external tari¤s
than FTA members: tuzk > t

zk where z = i; j and i and j are the two member countries.
Since CU members engage in (i) more internal trade liberalization and (ii) less external
liberalization relative to FTA members, one can expect that the free-riding incentive is
weaker whereas the exclusion incentive is more pronounced under the CU game relative to
the FTA game.
Next, we examine the role of MFN under Assumption 1. We rst state the following
lemma:
Lemma 5A: Regardless of whether the non-member country abides by MFN or not,
the following hold:
(i) Each country prefers to form a bilateral CU with the larger importer relative to
the smaller one.
(ii) The smaller importer (s) has no incentive to unilaterally or jointly deviate from
any agreement.
(iii) A country is worse o¤ as a non-member than as a CU member as well as
relative to no agreement or free trade.
It is immediate form the third part of the lemma that, a bilateral CU fails to be Pareto-
improving over no agreement. By contrast, Propositions 1 and 3 provide conditions under
which a bilateral FTA is necessarily Pareto-improving. Furthermore, the above lemma
informs us whether free trade obtains in equilibrium or not critically depends on the incen-
tive that the two larger importers have to exclude the smaller country. It turns out this
exclusion incentive arises only when the two larger importers are su¢ ciently larger than
the third country:  > l(F   ll0u). Here it is important to note that, since the member
countries under hll0ui are symmetric, the freedom to tari¤ discriminate is irrelevant from
the viewpoint of the non-member country. Thus, free trade arises in equilibrium whenever
  l(F   ll0u) whether or not countries are free to violate MFN.
But what if parameters are such that free trade does not arise in equilibrium? Does MFN
matter then? We next show that it does not. To this end, consider rst the announcement
proles leading to no agreement hi. Starting from hi, countries l and l0 have an incentive
to jointly alter their announcements to form hll0ui. Since this deviation is self-enforcing, hi
cannot arise in equilibrium. Similarly, based on parts (i) and (iii) of the Lemma 5A, we
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directly argue that countries l and l0 have an incentive to jointly alter their announcement
proles so that hslui is replaced by hll0ui and this deviation is self-enforcing since neither
country l nor l0 has an incentive to unilaterally deviate further since doing so leads to
hi. As a result, the only remaining candidate for equilibrium is the announcement prole
leading to hll0ui under which the the two member countries are symmetric. Based on the
above discussion, it is immediate that hll0ui is an equilibrium whenever   l(F   ll0u)
and this result obtains regardless of whether the non-member country is free to tari¤
discriminate or not. The following proposition summarizes our ndings.
Proposition 8: Regardless of whether the non-member country has to follow MFN or
not, free trade obtains in equilibrium whenever   l(F   ll0u) whereas the custom union
between the two larger countriesCU hll0ui arises otherwise.
The analysis above has shown that, given Assumption 1, imposing the MFN requirement
has no consequences for equilibrium outcomes (or welfare) of the CU game. But what if
the pattern of endowment asymmetry di¤ers from that given under Assumption 1? To
answer this question and to highlight the role of MFN, we now consider a slightly di¤erent
structure of endowment asymmetry and show that MFN indeed matters when the CU
involves two asymmetric countries:
Assumption 2: Country l is a larger importer than countries s and s0: es = es0 =
e  el = e where 1    5=4:16
We rst state the following lemma that explains the preferences of asymmetric countries
over trade regimes:
Lemma 5B: Suppose Assumption 2 describes the underlying endowment structure of
the world economy. Then, the following hold:
(i) Each country prefers to form a bilateral CU with a larger importer relative to a
smaller one: wi(iju   iku) > 0 i¤ ek > ej.
(ii) The smaller importers ( s and s0) neither have a unilateral incentive to break
up any agreement nor a joint incentive (with the other small country) to deviate from free
trade.
(iii) The non-member country is worse o¤ relative to no agreement as well as
relative to being the member of a bilateral CU: wk(iju ) < 0 and wk(iju  iku) < 0.
16As in the FTA game, the qualitative nature of our results is robust to a scenario where all three
countries are fully asymmetric, such as when es = se  em = me  el = e.
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It is worth noting that, even under Assumption 2, a bilateral CU is not Pareto-improving
over no agreement.
We are now ready to derive equilibrium outcomes under Assumption 2. First, let us
consider whether free trade as a candidate for an equilibrium outcome. Note from parts
(ii) and (iii) that the incentive for free riding on the trade liberalization of others is
rather limited in the CU game and the only country that would engage in a unilateral
deviation from free trade is country l and this happens only when the degree of asymmetry
is su¢ ciently large:  > l(F  ss0u). Similarly, it is immediate from part (iii) that, if there
exists a coalitional deviation from free trade, it must involve one of the smaller countries
(say s) and the large importer l. Countries s and l have an incentive to jointly deviate
from their respective announcements fs0u; lug and fsu; s0ug to f; lug and fsu; g in order
exclude country s0 when  > l(F   slu) and since neither has an incentive to further
deviate from their announcements, their initial joint deviation is self-enforcing. Note also
that since l(F   slu) < l(F   ss0u), the announcement prole leading supporting free
trade is an equilibrium whenever   l(F   slu). Here it is important to note that while
the exclusion incentive go unexercised in the FTA formation game due to the relatively
exible nature of FTAs, such is not the case in the CU game. In the FTA game, if two
countries (i and j) jointly exclude the third country from free trade by forming a bilateral
FTA then each member has an incentive to sign an independent FTA with the excluded
country thereby making itself a hub. The ability to act on this incentive acts as a deterrent
for the other initially deviating country (say country j) and thus the initial joint deviation
from free trade to a bilateral FTA does not occur. However, unlike the FTA game, no
such deterrent exists under the CU game since a CU member cannot form an independent
agreement with the excluded country without the consent of its CU partner.
What if  > l(F   slu) so that free trade fails to arise in equilibrium? It is easy
to dismiss the announcement proles leading to no agreement hi as candidates for an
equilibrium. This is because countries s and s0 have an incentive to jointly deviate from their
respective announcements f; g and f; g to f; s0ug and fsu; g to form the CU hss0ui.
Furthermore, since this deviation is self-enforcing, no agreement cannot be an equilibrium.
Similarly, based on parts (i) and (iii) of Lemma 5B, we can argue that countries s and
l always have incentives to jointly deviate from their announcement proles to the ones
that lead to a deviation from hss0ui to hslui and this deviation is self-enforcing since either
country s or l has no unilateral incentive to further deviate further to any announcement
that leads to hi. As a result, the only remaining candidate for equilibria are announcement
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proles leading to hslui. Based on the above discussion, it is immediate that hslui is an
equilibrium whenever   s(F   slu).
Next, we examine the implications of requiring MFN on the part of non-member coun-
tries that are trading with CU members. As indicated in Proposition 1, the larger member
country of hslui is better o¤ under tari¤ discrimination relative to MFN while the small
member is worse o¤. As a result, the exclusion incentive of the larger country is stronger
under tari¤ discrimination relative to MFN while that of the smaller country is weaker.
In fact, when the non-member is free to tari¤ discriminate, the smaller country has no
incentive exclude the other smaller country: ws(F   fslu) > 0. Thus, it is the unilat-
eral deviation incentive of the larger country that determines the equilibrium condition for
free trade: it turns out that when tari¤ discrimination is possible, free trade obtains in
equilibrium i¤   l(F  gss0u).17 We can now state:
Proposition 9: Given Assumption 2, the following hold:
(i) Free trade obtains in equilibrium regardless of whether the non-member country is
required to follow MFN whenever   l(F   slu).
(ii) When l(F   slu) <   l(F  gss0u), free trade obtains in equilibrium only if the
non-member country is free to tari¤ discriminate.
(iii) When  > l(F  gss0u) free trade is infeasible both under tari¤ discrimination and
MFN but imposing MFN increases world welfare by eliminating discrimination against the
larger country.
Insert Figure 5
As noted before, by making tari¤ discrimination infeasible, the non-discrimination con-
straint of MFN reduces the benet of being an outsider and thus lowers the unilateral
incentive for opting out of trade liberalization. Therefore, in the FTA game, by increas-
ing the likelihood of each country voluntarily choosing to enter into international trade
agreements, the MFN principle can act as a catalyst for the cause of global free trade.
However, when one country is deliberately excluded by the other two because they prefer
a bilateral trade agreement to a multilateral one (as can happen in the CU game), the
pro-liberalization e¤ect of MFN is weaker. As a result, whether MFN complements Article
17Note taht since member countries are symmetric under hss0ui, l(F   ss0u) = l(F  gss0u).
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XXIV in achieving global free trade depends on the nature of the trade agreement i.e.
whether it is an FTA or a CU. Finally, irrespective of the nature of the PTA in question,
MFN is welfare improving when free trade is infeasible (i.e. fails to obtain whether or not
an excluded country has to follow MFN). Thus, while whether WTO requirements specied
in Article I and Article XXIV increase the likelihood of global free trade depends on the
nature of PTAs, they are necessarily welfare improving in a tari¤-ridden world.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided an analysis of the interaction between two core GATT
rules governing trade liberalization at the WTO: Article 1 (MFN) that requires members
to adopt non-discriminatory trade policies toward one another and Article XXIV that
lays down conditions that countries entering into PTAs are required to follow. The two
most important conditions imposed by Article XXIV on PTA members are: (a) members
should eliminate trade restrictions on "substantially all trade" between themselves and (b)
refrain from raising trade restrictions on non-member countries. In our competing exporters
model, due to the existence of tari¤ complementarity, the second requirement of Article
XXIV turns out to be non-binding and the fate of the outside countries turns out to depend
upon whether or not PTA members are required to fully liberalize internal trade between
PTA.
To draw out the implications of requiring FTA members to eliminate tari¤s on one
another, we derive and contrast optimal tari¤s and equilibrium trade agreements under
two scenarios: under the WTO-consistent scenario, members are required to engage in free
internal trade whereas under unrestricted preferential liberalization scenario members are
free to impose non-zero internal tari¤s on one another. Under both scenarios, the non-
member is required to follow MFN. A comparison of these scenarios delivers several new
insights. First, we show that whether members of a PTA have an incentive to maintain
positive internal tari¤s on one another or not depends upon how they set their external
tari¤s. If PTA members set external tari¤s independently, as they do in an FTA, they
benet from not eliminating tari¤s on one another since doing so commits them to higher
external tari¤s. On the other hand, when external tari¤s are coordinated as they are under
a CU PTA members nd it optimal to eliminate internal tari¤s so that the restriction on
internal tari¤s imposed by Article XXIV becomes moot.
Our second major result is rather surprising: requiring FTA members to eliminate
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internal tari¤s benets the non-member since it leads to lower external tari¤s on the part
of FTA members. In other words, it is the Article XXIV requirement of free internal trade
amongst FTAs that ends up protecting the interest of the non-member as opposed to the
restriction on external tari¤s imposed on FTA members. Indeed, we show that the free
internal trade requirement can make it more likely that an FTA between two countries is
Pareto-improving relative to a scenario where no trade agreements exist.
Since our analysis derives equilibrium trade agreements in a game in which all countries
are free to form trade agreements with one another, we are able to speak to the consequences
of the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV for the likelihood of achieving global
free trade. Our major nding here is that this requirement on internal tari¤s of FTAs
makes it harder to achieve global free trade by limiting the negative impact of an FTA
on the non-member country: due to tari¤ complementarity, lower internal tari¤s within an
FTA also imply lower external tari¤s. By not entering into a trade agreement with FTA
members, the non-member country remains free to impose its optimal import tari¤s on
them while itself facing relatively lower tari¤s in their markets. Thus, it is possible that
the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV facilitates some degree of free-riding in
the WTO system by making it possible for non-member countries to benet from reductions
in external tari¤s of FTA members without having to reciprocate with tari¤ cuts of their
own. Thus, while the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV reduces the likelihood
of obtaining global free trade, it also increases welfare by lowering tari¤s world-wide when
global free trade is simply out of reach.
Finally, we show that the case for requiring MFN on the part of countries trading with
CUs from which they have been deliberately excluded is relatively weaker than the case for
MFN on the part of those countries that have themselves chosen not to join FTAs.
6 Appendix
In this Appendix we provide all supporting calculations and proofs.
6.1 Supporting calculations
We begin by reporting welfare levels as functions of an arbitrary tari¤ vectors. Then,
we report the optimal tari¤s under each trade regime. Using the welfare and tari¤ levels
reported below, we can easily obtain the formulae for optimum welfare levels under all
possible regimes. Lemmas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and the various inequalities reported in the main
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text follow from a direct application of the relevant formulae.
6.1.1 Welfare levels
We report welfare levels for country i under a trade regime r as a function of an arbitrary
tari¤ vector t(r) where t(r) = (tij(r); tik(r)) :
wi(r) =
X
z
CSzi (r) +
X
z
PSzi (r) + TRi(r)
whereX
z
CSzi (r)=
1
2

(
ej + ek   tij(r)  tik(r)
3
)2 + (
ei + ek + 2tji(r)  tjk(r)
3
)2 + (
ei + ej + 2tki(r)  tkj(r)
3
)2

X
z
PSzi (r)=
ei[6  2ei   ej   ek + tjk(r) + tkj(r)  2tji(r)  2tki(r)]
3
and
TRi(r) =
tij(r)[2ej   ek + tik(r)  2tij(r)]
3
+
tik(r)[2ek   ej + tij(r)  2tik(r)]
3
:
6.1.2 Optimal Tari¤s
Next, we report the optimal tari¤s under each regime and provide supporting calculations
for our tari¤ discussion in the text. Country is optimal MFN tari¤ is
ti  Argmax wi() =
ej + ek
8
(29)
First, consider a scenario where countries are free to discriminate. Under no agreement
hi (or under an FTA for a non-member country), (tij; tik) solve argmaxwi():
tij() =
3ej   ek
8
and tik() =
3ek   ej
8
The following is immediate:
tij()  tik() =
(ej   ek)
2
> 0 i¤ ej > ek
Relative to the case of MFN, countries impose higher discriminatory tari¤ on the im-
ports from the country with larger endowment:
ti   tij() =
2(ek   ej)
8
< 0 i¤ ej > ek
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Next, we examine the FTA member tari¤s. First we show that, holding everything else
constant, non-member country loses as internal tari¤s of an FTA decline:
@wk(ij)
@ ij
=
2(ek    ij)  (ej    ij)
9
> 0
Suppose now that external tari¤s are optimally chosen. Then, we nd the following
optimum external tari¤ as a function of internal tari¤ between member countries:
tik(ij) =
5ek   4ej + 7 ij
11
Note that the tari¤ complementarity holds:
@tik(ij)
@ ij
=
7
11
> 0
We next show that, when external tari¤s are optimally chosen by FTA members, we
obtain:
@wk(ij)
@ ij
=  4ek   tij   ej
121
< 0
If countries could coordinate internal tari¤s before setting their individually optimum
external tari¤s, FTA members can partially internalize the e¤ects of their tari¤s on one
another: ( ij;  ji)  argmax [wi(ij) + wj(ij)]:
 ij =
3ej   ek
63
> 0
Then the optimal external tari¤ is as follows:
tik(ij) =
4ek   3ej
9
(30)
Under free internal trade, the optimum external tari¤ under an FTA (and the optimal
spokes tari¤ under a hub and spoke regime) is immediate:
tik(ij) = tik(jh) =
5 ek   4ej
11
Under a CU, we found the following optimum external tari¤s as a function of the internal
tari¤s:
tik(ij
u) =
2 ek   ej
5
+
 ij
2
(31)
Note that, while it is weaker relative to an FTA game, the tari¤ complementarity still
holds:
@tik(ij
u)
@ ij
=
1
2
> 0
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We nd that it is optimum for CU members to eliminate internal tari¤s:
@[wi(ij
u) + wj(ij
u)]
@ ij
=   ij
2
< 0
As a result, the following jointly optimal external tari¤s under hijui obtain:
tik(ij
u) =
2 ek   ej
5
(32)
Note that we obtain higher external tari¤s under a CU relative to an FTA: tik(iju) > tik(ij).
6.2 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Note that the proof of Lemma 1 is immediate from the optimal tari¤ discussion above.
Proof of Lemma 2
Using the above welfare formulae (as functions of an arbitrary tari¤ vectors) and plug-
ging the above optimum tari¤s into them, it is straightforward to show the following in-
equalities:
Part (i): wl(ll0   sl) > 0 for all 1    5=4.
Part (ii): ws(sl   ) > 0, ws(sh   sl) > 0, and ws(F   lh) > 0 hold for all
1    5=4 while ws(lh  ll0) > 0 only when  > s(lh  ll0) = 1:03.
Part (iii): wl0(lh  sl) < 0 and wl0(lh  sl) < 0 for all 1    5=4 while ws(lh 
ll0) > 0 only when  > s(lh  ll0) = 1:03.
Part (iv): wi(ih   ) > 0, wi(F   ih) < 0 and wi(ih   ij) > 0 for all for all
1    5=4 and i = s; l; l0.
Proof of Proposition 1
Using the above welfare formulae (as functions of an arbitrary tari¤ vectors) and plug-
ging the above optimum tari¤s into them, it is straightforward to show thatws(sl ) > 0
holds for all 1    5=4 while wl(sl   ) > 0 only when  < l(sl   ) = 1:24. Sim-
ilarly, we obtain wl(ll0   ) > 0 for all 1    5=4 while ws(ll0   ) > 0 only when
 < s(ll
0   ) = 1:09.
Proof of Proposition 2
Using the results from Lemma 2, the discussion in the main text and the following
inequalities, it is straightforward to prove Proposition 2:
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- wl(F   ll0) < 0 when  > l(F   ll0) = 1:085;
- wl(F   l0h) = wl0(F   lh) < 0 when  > l(F   l0h) = 1:18;
- wl(F   sl0) = wl0(F   sl) < 0 when  > l(F   sl0) = 1:181;
- ws(lh  ll0) > 0 when  > s(lh  ll0) = 1:03.
Proof of Lemma 3
Using the above welfare formulae (as functions of an arbitrary tari¤ vectors) and plug-
ging the above optimum tari¤s (without free internal trade requirement) into them, it is
straightforward to show the following inequalities:
Part (i): ws(bsl   ) > 0, wl(bsl   ) > 0, wl(bll0   ) > 0 for all 1    5=4.
Part (ii): wl(bll0   bsl) > 0 for all 1    5=4.
Part (iii): ws(bsl ) > 0, ws(csh  bsl) > 0, ws(F   blh) > 0 and ws(lh  ll0) > 0
hold for all 1    5=4.
Part (iv): wl(cl0h csl0) < 0 when  > l(cl0h csl0) = 1:029 and wl(csh csl0) < 0 when
 > l(cl0h csl0) = 1:037:
Part (iv): wi( bih   ) > 0 and wi( bih   bij) > 0 for all for all 1    5=4 and
i = s; l; l0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Along with the rst part of Lemma 3, using the above welfare formulae (as functions of
an arbitrary tari¤ vectors) and plugging the above optimum tari¤s (without free internal
trade requirement) into them, it is straightforward to show that wl0(bsl ) > 0 holds for
all 1    5=4 while ws(bll0   ) > 0 only when  < s(bll0   ) = 1:076.
Proof of Lemma 4
Using the above welfare formulae (as functions of an arbitrary tari¤ vectors) and plug-
ging the above optimum tari¤s (with and without free internal trade requirement) into
them, it is straightforward to show that l(F   bll0) = 1:082 < l(F   ll0) = 1:085.
Proof of Proposition 4
Using the results from Lemmas 3 and 4, the discussion in the main text and the following
inequalities, it is straightforward to prove Proposition 4:
- wl(F   bll0) < 0 when  > l(F   bll0) = 1:085;
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- wl(F  cl0h) = wl0(F   blh) < 0 when  > l(F  cl0h) = 1:138;
- wl(F  csh) = wl(F  csh) < 0 when  > l(F  csh) = 1:130;
- wl(F  csl0) = wl0(F   bsl) < 0 when  > l(F  csl0) = 1:037;
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is immediate from the proofs of Propositions 2 and 4.
Proof of Proposition 6
Using the above welfare formulae (as functions of an arbitrary tari¤ vectors) and plug-
ging the above optimum tari¤s under discrimination into them, it is straightforward to
show the following inequalities:
- ws(esl   e) > 0 and wl0(esl   e) > 0 for all 1    5=4 while wl(esl   e) > 0
holds only when  < l(esl   e) = 1:159.
- ws(ll0   e) > 0 and wl(ll0   e) = wl0(ll0   e) > 0 for all 1    5=4.
- l(esl   e) = 1:159 < l(sl   ) = 1:24.
Proof of Proposition 7
Using the above welfare formulae (as functions of an arbitrary tari¤ vectors) and plug-
ging the above optimum tari¤s under discrimination into them, we can make the following
discussion. First, we show when the announcement proles leading to free trade is a
CPNE. We can argue the following three results that follows directly the benchmark case.
First, countries l and l0 always have incentives to jointly deviate from their respective an-
nouncements f; g and f; g to f; l0g and f; lg and form hll0i. Since this deviation is
self-enforcing, hi is never a CPNE. Second, we know from Lemma 2 that a large spoke
country (say l) under hshi and hl0hi always has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from
its respective announcements fs; g and f; l0g to f; g and f; g, leading to a deviation
from hshi to ghsl0i and from hl0hi to ghsl0i. Since unilateral deviations are self-enforcing, the
announcement proles leading to any hub and spoke regime is never a CPNE. Third, the
coalitional announcement deviation from hll0i to hF i happens when   l(F   ll0) = 1:19
and it is self-enforcing only when   l(F  fsl0) = 1:075. Second, we show that, when
 > s(lh   ll0) = 1:033 holds, country s and either of the large member countries (say l)
have incentives to jointly deviate from their respective announcements f; g and f; l0g
to fl; g and fs; l0g, leading to a deviation from hll0i to hlhi and this deviation is self en-
forcing. Since s(lh  ll0) < l(F  fsl0), these self-enforcing announcement deviations cover
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the entire parameter space and thus the announcement prole leading to hll0i is never a
CPNE.
Based on the above discussion, the only possible announcement proles that can be
CPNE are the ones leading to hF i andghsli. As in the benchmark case, we can immediately
argue that the unilateral deviation of the either large importer from free trade announce-
ments is critical for the CPNE condition. To this end, we nd that country l unilaterally
deviates from fs; l0g to f; g:
wl(F  fsl0) = wl0(F   esl) < 0 when  > l(F  fsl0) = 1:075 (33)
We nd that l(F  fsl0) < l(F   l0h) = 1:138 holds and thus the announcement prole
leading to hF i is CPNE when   l(F  fsl0).
Finally consider ghsli. We nd that, when  > l(esl   e) = 1:159, country l has
an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its announcement fs; g to f; g leading to a
deviation from hsli to hi and as indicated in Proposition 6, we have l(esl e) < l(sl ).
Second, we know from part (iv) of Lemma 2 that the coalitional announcement deviation
leading to a deviation from ghsli to hll0i is not self-enforcing since the common member
country (l here) always has an incentive to further deviate to become the hub country,
taking the announcement of its complement xed. Third, note from the above discussion
that the coalitional announcement deviation leading a deviation from ghsli to hF i is self-
enforcing only when   l(F  fsl0). Finally, country l0 has no incentive to engage in any
coalitional announcement deviations that lead to a deviation fromghsli to hshi or fromghsli
to hlhi. As a result, we argue that the announcement prole leading to hsli is a CPNE
when l(F  fsl0)    l(esl   e).
Proof of Lemma 5A
Using the above welfare formulae (as functions of an arbitrary tari¤ vectors) and plug-
ging the above optimum tari¤s under CUs into them, it is straightforward to show the
following inequalities:
Part (i): wl(ll0u   slu) > 0 for all 1    5=4.
Part (ii): ws(slu   ) > 0, ws(F   slu) > 0, and ws(F   ll0u) > 0 hold for all
1    5=4.
Part (iii): ws(ll0u ) < 0, wl(sl0u ) < 0, ws(F ll0u) > 0 andwl(F sl0u) > 0
for all 1    5=4.
Proof of Proposition 8
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Using Lemma 5A and the following inequality, the proof is complete: wl(F   ll0u) < 0
when  > l(F   ll0u) = 1:023:
Proofs of Lemma 5B
Part (i): ws(slu   ss0u) > 0 for all 1    5=4.
Part (ii): ws(slu ) > 0,ws(ss0u ) > 0,ws(F ss0u) > 0 andws(F s0lu) > 0
hold for all 1    5=4.
Part (iii)ws(s0lu ) < 0, wl(ss0u ) < 0, ws(s0lu slu) < 0, ws(s0lu ss0u) < 0,
and wl(ss0u   slu) < 0 hold for all 1    5=4.
Proof of Proposition 9
Using Lemma 5B and the following inequalities, the proof is complete. We havewl(F 
ss0u) < 0 when  > l(F ss0u) = 1:231,ws(F slu) < 0 when  > s(F slu) = 1:049 and
wl(F   slu) < 0 when  > l(F   slu) = 1:045. Under discrimination, ws(F   fslu) > 0
holds for all 1    5=4. Moreover, wl(F  gss0u) < 0 when  > l(F  gss0u) = 1:231.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium agreements under the benchmark WTO game (FTA) 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium agreements without free internal trade requirement (FTA) 
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Figure 3: Free trade with/without free internal trade requirement (FTA) 
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Figure 4: Free trade with/without MFN requirement (FTA) 
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Figure 5: Free trade with/without MFN requirement (CU): two small and one large countries 
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